

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

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S E C R E T STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

EXDIS - FOR HARTMAN STATE AND CLIFT NSC

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, GR

SUBJECT:BRIEFING MEMORANDUM -- DISCUSSION WITH GREEK

PRIME MINISTER: CSCE REVISION

1. PARTICIPANTS:

-- US GREECE

-- THE PRESIDENT PRIME MINISTER CONSTANTINE

-- THE SECRETARY CARAMANLIS

-- ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHONETIC: KA-RA-MAN-LIS

-- HARTMAN ADDRESSED: MR. PRIME MINISTER

-- FOREIGN MINISTER DIMITRI S.

-- BITSIOS

-- PHONETIC: BI-TZEE-OS

-- ADDRESSED: MR. MINISTER

-- AMBASSADOR MOLYVIATIS, CHEF

-- DU CABINET, INTERPRETER

- PHONETIC: MOE-LEE-VJAH-TIS

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

-- ADDRESSED: MR. AMBASSADOR

2. LANGUAGE: GREEK/ENGLISH (INTERPRETER)

3. CHECKLIST:

-- CONGRATULATE CARAMANLIS ON THE STEPS GREECE HAS TAKEN TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY, INCLUDING ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION AND THE ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT (CONSTANTINE TSATSOS).

-- ARMS EMBARGO TO TURKEY. STRESS THAT OUR EFFORTS TO LIFT THE EMBARGO WERE MOTIVATED BY DESIRE TO HELP RESOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, RECONCILE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, AND RESTORE STABILITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. INDICATE WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD THESE ENDS.

-- CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN. ENCOURAGE CONTINUATION OF DIRECT GREEK-TURKISH DIALOGUE, BUT INDICATE THAT OUR ABILITY TO BE HELPFUL WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED BECAUSE OF OUR LOSS OF INFLUENCE IN ANKARA.

-- US ASSISTANCE TO GREECE. EXPLAIN THAT UNTIL ARMS EMBARGO TO TURKEY IS LIFTED, YOU WILL BE UNABLE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH A RECOMMENDATION IN CONGRESS FOR ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC OR MILITARY AID TO GREECE.

-- GREEK-NATO RELATIONSHIP. REITERATE OUR HOPE THAT GREECE WILL RESUME FULL PARTICIPATION IN NATO.

-- US-GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS. ASK FOR GREEK COOPERATION IN NEGOTIATIONS SCHEDULED THIS FALL AND WINTER.

-- MIDDLE EAST. OUR EFFORTS TO MOVE ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD ARE CONTINUING, AND WE HOPE OUR ALLIES WILL BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT THE BALANCE AND TIMING OF ANY FURTHER STATEMENTS THEY MAKE ABOUT THEIR POSITION.

4. CSCE.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

GREECE GENERALLY SUPPORTED AGREED NATO POSITIONS WHILE GIVING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN EUROPE. GREECE AT ONE TIME THREATENED TO BLOCK THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE UNLESS THERE WAS PROGRESS IN SOLVING THE CYPRUS SITUATION, BUT IN THE END MADE NO MOVE TO DO SO. HOWEVER, CARAMANLIS CAN BE EXPECTED TO DRAW ATTENTION TO TURKISH ACTION ON CYPRUS IN HIS STAGE III STATEMENT.

5. SETTING

YOU LAST SAW CARAMANLIS IN BRUSSELS AT THE NATO SUMMIT. CARAMANLIS AND TURKISH PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL TOOK AD-

VANTAGE OF THIS "NEUTRAL" GROUND TO HAVE A LONG PRIVATE MEETING WHICH, THOUGH IT LED TO NO MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH, DID HELP CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS.

SINCE THEN, PROGRESS HAS BEEN SLOW BOTH ON CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN ISSUES. DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN HELD IN ANKARA AND ATHENS TO RESOLVE THE AEGEAN DISPUTE, BUT THE TURKS HAVE FAILED TO AGREE ON SETTING A DATE FOR A MEETING TO DRAFT THE LEGAL DOCUMENT FOR SUBMITTING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF QUESTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT. THE CYPRUS INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, WHICH HAVE HAD NO CONCRETE RESULTS TO DATE, WILL RESUME IN VIENNA ON JULY 31.

WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL DECISION LAST WEEK TO MAINTAIN AN ARMS EMBARGO ON TURKEY, CHANCES OF DOING ANYTHING POSITIVE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN IN THE SHORT RUN HAVE ALL BUT DISAPPEARED. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL BE AWARE OF THIS FACT, BUT WILL BE RELUCTANT TO ACKNOWLEDGE PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH IT DESERVES TO BEAR, FOR WHAT OCCURRED IN WASHINGTON.

CARAMANLIS CONTINUES TO ENJOY WIDE POPULAR SUPPORT IN GREECE, AND HE REMAINS COMMITTED TO GREECE'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE WEST. AT THIS STAGE, CARAMANLIS AND THE GREEKS GENERALLY ARE CONCERNED LESS ABOUT CYPRUS THAN THEY ARE ABOUT THE AEGEAN, WHERE THEY FEEL TURKEY MAY HAVE AGGRESSIVE AMBITIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

CARAMANLIS REMAINS PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED IN OUR ABILITY TO OBTAIN TURKISH CONCESSIONS ON CYPRUS AND TO MODERATE TURKISH AMBITIONS IN THE AEGEAN. HE STILL BELIEVES WE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE WITH ANKARA.

OUR OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO MAKE CLEAR TO CARAMANLIS WHY WE CONSIDER THE BEHAVIOR OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND ESPECIALLY HIS EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON UNHELPFUL AND IMPROPER, AND WHY, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL ACTION LAST WEEK, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BE OF MUCH IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING ISSUES SUCH AS CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN.

6. COURTESY POINT

-- CONGRATULATE THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS RECENT STEPS TO COMPLETE THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN GREECE, INCLUDING THE ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION AND THE ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT, CONSTANTINE TSATSOS.

7. ISSUES/TALKING POINTS

A. ARMS EMBARGO ON TURKEY

THE CARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT HAD ASSURED YOU IN BRUSSELS OF ITS INTENTION TO REMAIN SILENT, WHILE WE WORKED TO REMOVE THE ARMS EMBARGO ON TURKEY. INSTEAD, THE GREEK EMBASSY LOBBIED INTENSELY AGAINST A LIFTING OF THE BAN AND, DURING THE WEEK BEFORE THE HOUSE VOTE, THE GREEK AMBASSADOR ISSUED THREE STATEMENTS IN EFFECT CONFIRMING GREEK OPPOSITION TO ARMS SALES TO TURKEY. THIS MATTER WAS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR KUBISCH WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS AND BY UNDERSECRETARY SISCO WITH GREEK AMBASSADOR ALEXANDRAKIS.

YOUR TALKING POINTS

-- YOUR AMBASSADOR'S PRESS STATEMENTS IN WASHINGTON JUST BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE AMOUNTED TO AN IMPROPER INTERFERENCE INTO OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IF OUR EMBASSY IN ATHENS TOOK ACTION OR ISSUED PRESS STATEMENTS ON GREEK LEGISLATIVE MATTERS, WE WOULD HAVE STORMY
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST OUR CHANCERY AND PROTESTS FROM THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.

-- WE WANTED TO LIFT THE EMBARGO TO PREVENT A DETERIORATION IN OUR RELATIONS WITH ANKARA, AND TO ALLOW THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON CYPRUS -- A MOVE IT COULD NOT MAKE UNDER OBVIOUS FOREIGN PRESSURE.

-- FAILURE TO LIFT THE EMBARGO HAS REDUCED OUR INFLUENCE IN ANKARA AND MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN THE CYPRUS AND AEGEAN DISPUTES. THIS FAILURE HAS ALSO LED TO A DETERIORATION IN THE SECURITY OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

-- WE PLAN TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO LIFT THE EMBARGO.

B' CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN

CARAMANLIS IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE PRESENT STALEMATE ON CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN, AND HE IS ANXIOUS TO RESOLVE BOTH THESE ISSUES TO ENABLE GREECE TO CONCENTRATE ON OTHER MATTERS, PARTICULARLY THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF HIS COUNTRY AND THE COMPLETION OF THE DE-JUNTAIZATION PROCESS. HE IS FRUSTRATED, HOWEVER, BY WHAT HE SEES AS STALLING TACTICS BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. LAST SPRING AT GREEK REQUEST WE ISSUED A STATEMENT IMPLYING WE WOULD NOT ALLOW TURKISH

MILITARY ACTION IN THE AEGEAN. SHOULD THE GREEKS SEEK A RENEWAL OF THAT PLEDGE, WE SHOULD BE CONSIDERABLY LESS FORTHCOMING.

YOUR TALKING POINTS

-- TURKISH DISSATISFACTION WITH US WILL MAKE MOVEMENT IN THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS OR IN THE AEGEAN LESS LIKELY.

-- OUR INTEREST IN SEEING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS AND AEGEAN PROBLEMS REMAINS AS STRONG AS EVER, BUT OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENTS IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION IS FOR THE MOMENT SEVERELY LIMITED BY THE DOWN-SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

WARD SPIRAL IN US-TURKISH RELATIONS.

C. US ASSISTANCE TO GREECE.

THE GREEKS HAVE REQUESTED SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. PROVISION FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE WAS CONTAINED IN THE COMPROMISE BILL ON AID TO TURKEY, WHICH THE HOUSE DEFEATED ON JULY 24.

YOUR TALKING POINTS

-- DEFEAT OF THE COMPROMISE HOUSE LEGISLATION WILL PREVENT THE ADMINISTRATION FROM PROCEEDING IN THE NEAR FUTURE WITH LARGE-SCALE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE.

-- WE HAD INTENDED TO PROVIDE LARGER AMOUNT OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDITS TO GREECE IN FY 1976, BUT THIS PLAN PLUS OUR HOPE OF RESUMING A SUBSTANTIAL GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS NOW IN QUESTION UNTIL CONGRESS ALLOWS US TO END OUR ARMS EMBARGO TO TURKEY.

D. GREEK-NATO RELATIONSHIP.

DURING TURKEY'S INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS LAST SUMMER, CARAMANLIS ANNOUNCED GREECE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MILITARY SIDE OF NATO. HE HAS NEVER FULLY IMPLEMENTED THAT DECISION, HOWEVER, AND TALKS WILL BEGIN IN BRUSSELS IN MID-SEPTEMBER TO CLARIFY THE GREEK-NATO RELATIONSHIP. OUR POSITION HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE GREECE TO RESUME FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE ALLIANCE, AND TO INSIST THAT OUR BILATERAL BASE NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE COMPLETED UNTIL THE GREEK ROLE IN NATO IS CLARIFIED.

YOUR TALKING POINTS

-- WE SEE CLOSE MILITARY COOPERATION AMONG ALL THE NATO ALLIES AS ESSENTIAL, AND FEEL STRONGLY THAT NATO MUST PRESERVE ITS INTEGRITY AS AN INSTITUTION.

-- THEREFORE, WE HOPE THAT CONDITIONS WILL SOON PERMIT

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

GREECE TO RESUME ITS FULL ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE.

-- WE WILL BE AS FORTHCOMING AND HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE WHEN THE GREEK-NATO NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN THIS SEPTEMBER IN BRUSSELS.

E. US-GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS

THERE HAVE BEEN TWO ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS -- THE LAST IN APRIL -- WHICH ENDED IN A COOPERATIVE SPIRIT. FURTHER TECHNICAL TALKS IN JUNE AND JULY WENT LESS WELL. SPECIFICALLY, GREECE WANTS US TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY OUR PRESENCE AT ATHENS HELLENIKON AIRFIELD AND ALL SIXTH FLEET USE OF PIERS IN GREECE. THE TECHNICAL TALKS WILL RESUME IN SEPTEMBER, AND A MORE FORMAL NEGOTIATING ROUND WILL PROBABLY BE HELD LATER IN THE YEAR.

WE APPRECIATE THE GREEK DESIRE TO LOWER THE VISIBILITY OF OUR FACILITIES, BUT THOSE FACILITIES, AND ACCESS TO GREEK PORTS, ARE OF CONSIDERABLE MUTUAL IMPORTANCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SECURITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

YOUR TALKING POINTS

-- THE US-GREEK SECURITY RELATIONSHIP SERVES THE INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. WE WOULD THEREFORE WELCOME A FORTHCOMING AND COOPERATIVE GREEK POSITION WHEN OUR BILATERAL TALKS RESUME THIS FALL AND WINTER.

-- WE ASK THE PRIME MINISTER TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE WITH RESPECT TO SUCH ISSUES AS SHIP VISITS AND THE USE OF FACILITIES WE NOW HAVE IN GREECE.

F. SALT

DURING AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S MAY 7 CONSULTATION WITH NAC, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE "PETRIGNANI GROUP" -- AN INFORMAL CAUCUS OF NATO REPRESENTATIVES ON SALT MATTERS, WHICH GREECE DOES NOT PARTICIPATE IN -- PRESENTED A PAPER OUTLINING ALLIED POSITIONS ON A NUMBER OF SALT ISSUES.

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

-- FBS: SOVIET EFFORTS TO RAISE FBS IN THE PROVISION ON FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE MET WITH A FIRM REJECTION.

-- DEFINITIONS, VERIFICATION, OTHER ISSUES AS APPROPRIATE:

SHOULD AVOID LANGUAGE WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE ALLIED INTERESTS IN OTHER DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

-- NON-TRANSFER: SHOULD BE FIRMLY REJECTED. IF ESSENTIAL, SOVIET INSISTENCE COULD BE MET BY A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE. ALLIES EXPECT PRIOR CONSULTATION.

WE HAVE TOLD THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA AND THE ALLIES THAT WE CANNOT CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER UNTIL THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT AND THAT THE ABM AGREEMENT PROVISION ON NON-TRANSFER DOES NOT NECESSARILY ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT FOR OFFENSIVE ARMS.

TALKING POINTS

-- WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT THIS YEAR BASED ON THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING
-- AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL ENHANCE ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS.

-- WE CONSIDER US AND ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS TO BE INSEPARABLE, AND WE WILL TAKE NO ACTIONS IN SALT WHICH JEOPARDIZE THESE INTERESTS.

-- THE ISSUES OF FBS AND THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS WERE SETTLED AT VLADIVOSTOK AND ARE NOT IN THE PURVIEW OF SALT II. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO RULE OUT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO REOPEN THESE QUESTIONS.

-- AS WE PROCEED WE WILL MAINTAIN OUR CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY ON SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL ALLIED INTEREST.

-- WE WILL CONSULT WITH OUR NATO ALLIES PRIOR TO DISCUSSING ANY NON-TRANSFER OR NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROPOSALS
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

WITH THE SOVIETS.

G. MIDDLE EAST.

THE EUROPEANS -- PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH, LESS SO THE BRITISH -- CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME EUROPEAN ROLE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTEXT. THEY ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT BEING READY TO PUT THEIR POSITION ON THE RECORD IF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS ON A FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT BREAK DOWN OR IF THE NEGOTIATIONS MOVE TO A NEW PHASE AT GENEVA. WE HAVE SO FAR SUCCESSFULLY DISCOURAGED ANY FORMAL EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, BUT THEY ARE GOING AHEAD WITH CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO REINFORCE

THEIR UNDERSTANDING THAT WE REMAIN FULLY COMMITTED TO EARLY PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS, THAT WE ARE SENSITIVE TO EUROPEAN DESIRES TO BE HELPFUL, BUT THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY BE CAREFUL IN THE TIMING OF ANY STEP THEY TAKE.

IN ADDITION, WE HAVE ALREADY CONSULTED WITH MEMBERS OF THE EC-NINE ON THE BEST STRATEGY FOR ASSURING THE EARLY SUPPRESSION OF THE RADICAL ARAB MOVE TO EXCLUDE ISRAEL FROM THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS YEAR, AND THE EUROPEANS APPEAR UNIFIED IN COORDINATING WITH US TO OPPOSE THIS MOVE. HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT THEIR APPROACHES TO THE ARABS HAVE NOT BEEN VIGOROUS. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO REITERATE OUR STRONG OPPOSITION TO EXPULSION IN TERMS OF ITS SERIOUS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS AND ON THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UN AND TO ENCOURAGE THE EUROPEANS INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY TO BROADEN THEIR EFFORT.

TALKING POINTS

-- WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO HELP EGYPT AND ISRAEL REACH AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IN THE SINAI, BUT SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS REMAIN AND WE STILL CANNOT BE SURE THAT AN AGREEMENT WILL BE ACHIEVED.

-- REGARDLESS OF THE RESULTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE
SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 177308 TOSEC 080042

UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE ITS FIRM COMMITMENT TO PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE IN THAT AREA. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS ANOTHER INTERIM STEP, THE FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE TO SHIFT FROM INTERIM STEPS TO AN OVERALL AGREEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE HAVE ALWAYS KNOWN THAT THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH WOULD MERGE WITH DISCUSSION OF A PEACE AGREEMENT AT SOME POINT, AND WE ARE NEARING THAT POINT.

-- IN THIS REGARD, A GENERAL EUROPEAN POSTURE WOULD BE HELPFUL WHICH, IN THE COURSE OF ROUTINE CONTACTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IMPRESSES ON ISRAEL THE NEED FOR MOVEMENT AND ON THE ARABS, THAT MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE WILL REQUIRE MOVEMENT TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, NOT JUST THE ABSENCE OF WAR.

-- ON THE QUESTION OF A MORE SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF EUROPE'S POSITION, WE HOPE OUR ALLIES WILL BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT THE TIMING AND BALANCE OF ANY SUCH STEP.

-- ONE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WHICH CONFRONTS US, AND ON WHICH WE WILL WANT TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH EUROPE, IS THE RADICAL ARAB MOVE TO EXCLUDE ISRAEL FROM THE NEXT UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSE-

QUENCES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE UN AND FOR THE ARAB-ISRAEL-
NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD UNDO MOST OF THE PROGRESS THAT
THE ARABS HAVE MADE IN CONVINCING ISRAEL THAT ARAB ACCEPT-
ANCE OF ISRAEL IS POSSIBLE.

-- WE WILL WANT TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS SPECIFIC
PROBLEM, AS WELL AS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL.

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